Abstract Wang Hui is a significant contemporary Chinese thinker and a key representative of Chinese New Left thought. This essay provides a critical review of some of the themes that emerge from Wang's The End of Revolution as a means of situating his position in China's intellectual landscape, with a particular mind to exploring the historicity of Wang's thought as it informs his views. The essay engages some of the key discursive threads in The End of Revolution and provides a critical overview of Wang's positions on neoliberalism, the tension between Western articulations of modernity and China's own self-image.
Introduction
For much of the past decade, Professor Wang Hui (b. 1959 In the following sections, we offer a review of some of the key discursive threads in
The End of Revolution that we deem of particular significance to students of modern Chinese history. Yet, we also concede right at the outset that such a review --based as it is on essays in translation --cannot cover the entire breadth of Wang's complex thought as manifest in his Chinese-language work. Instead, we foretaste here Wang's thought on neoliberalism and on the tension between Western articulations of modernity and China's own self-image in pre-modern times as progressive cosmopolitan Empire.
The New Left and the Critique of Neoliberalism
Until the emergence of the New Left movement in the 1990s, the reform era intellectual landscape was dominated by a narrative in which 'traditional' China was obliged to catch up with the 'modern' West. Progress towards this conception of modernity meant distancing from non-Western traditions embodied in the authoritarian continuities of feudalism and Maoism. Liberal intellectuals envisaged a process in which the market would foster the liberation of society from the state. In basic terms, most 'liberals' and 'neoliberals' see the pre-modern Chinese state, embodied in the imperial bureaucracy, as predatory and all-pervasive, and suggest that these qualities atavistically configured Chinese modernity as a whole. In that sense, there are similarities between Chinese 'liberal' and 'neo-liberal' views and those of Karl Wittfogel (1957) (Dikötter 2013) . In that sense, the peasants who brought the CCP to power were ultimately strongly disadvantaged vis-à-vis city dwellers, and as Wang acknowledges, it was only in 1978 that the rural-urban gap began to close somewhat (pp. 23-24, p.
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26).
A further contradiction arises in the sense that the vague civilizational alternative to the nation-state straitjacket Wang advocates, itself appears to be an antidote to the politicised society characteristic of the Mao era which Wang often seems to pine for. Wang's rather enigmatic summation is that 'all universalisms are actually part of particular phenomenon, rather than simply existing within the dichotomy of particular universalisms' (p. 116). He then adds that the question of whether China is a nation-state or an Empire is unanswerable (p.132).
In Matters of History, History Matters
Wang's self-described 'difficult' prose is not as significant an obstacle to England's civil service system was inspired to a degree by China's civil service tradition' (p. 135). Typically none of these 'many studies' is cited, and a closer historical analysis shows that the empirical basis for this argument is tenuous. Albeit uncited by Wang, we hasten to add that an authoritative study claiming Chinese inspiration for British civil-service meritocracy does exist. Yet, it was penned by Teng Ssu-yu (1943) , and was based on circumstantial rather than archival sources.
In fact, the Northcote-Trevelyan Report on the British civil service (1853) led to the replacement of political patronage in favour of life-long appointment of apolitical mandarins with broad liberal educations, and advanced the notion that recruitment of British civil servants should be based on a generalist examination system (Chapman and Greenaway 1980 
